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Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in 
Post-Divorce Child Custody Disputes 
Carolyn J. Frantz 
There may be no story as old as that of the child of privilege, 
spoiled in the things of the world, who finally achieves happiness 
through coming to appreciate the simple charms of working-class life. 
But equal in strength are the real life stories of American parents: 
their drive for the accumulation of personal wealth, so frequently justi­
fied as "for the children." The place of wealth in the good life of a 
child is deeply controversial, and it should surprise no one to see it 
played out in child custody law. 
Under the statutes of almost all states, custody disputes between 
divorcing parents must be decided in the "best interests of the child."1 
These statutes often list particular factors that are to be considered 
when deciding children's interests, such as "[t]he love, affection, and 
other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the 
child."2 Some statutes also expressly forbid consideration of particular 
factors, such as the gender of the parent.3 Even with these attempts to 
narrow the inquiry, the best-interests standard remains notably vague.4 
This inevitably leads to serious disputes about which factors ought to 
be considered, and how much weight they should be given. Perhaps 
the most troubling of these disputes has involved the relevance to the 
custody decision of each parent's ability to provide the child with ma­
terial goods. 
A few states address this issue directly in their child custody stat­
utes. Florida and Michigan explicitly provide that parental ability to 
1. E.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.24.150(c) (Michie 1998) ("The court shall determine custody 
in accordance with the best interests of the child."). For a comprehensive list of these stat­
utes, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 236-37 nn.45-47 (1975). 
The "best interests of the child" standard defies easy definition. For a fuller discussion, 
see infra text accompanying notes 23-32. The standard does not apply outside of divorce cus­
tody cases, where custody determinations are between parents and nonparents. The due 
process clause protects parents' interests in the nondestruction of their families unless a state 
can show sufficient harm to the child. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(a) (West 1993). 
3. E.g. ,  ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-lOl(a) (Michie 1998) ("In an action for divorce, the 
award of custody of the children of the marriage shall be made without regard to the sex of 
the parent."). 
4. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 256 (discussing the "inherent indeterminacy of the 
best-interests standard").  
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satisfy a child's material needs is a factor in custody determinations.5 
Missouri explicitly forbids consideration of a parent's financial re­
sources.6 Oregon allows its consideration only where the child is suf­
fering emotional or physical harm.7 Most states, however, leave the is­
sue to the discretion of the courts, who are asked to interpret broad 
statutory requirements like "the capability and desire of each parent 
to meet [the child's] needs"8 or "[t]he health, safety, and welfare of the 
child"9 or catch-all provisions like "other factors that the court consid­
ers pertinent."10 
In a sense, considering wealth in child custody decisions is the ob­
vious choice. Rhetoric underlying calls for better enforcement of child 
support and expressions of concern about the effects of welfare reform 
seem to presuppose that access to economic resources is an essential 
component of children's welfare.11 Society is committed to the view 
that money matters to children. Many courts take this view, often con­
sidering financial factors without pausing to provide further justifica­
tion.12 Even where courts are not explicit about the relevance of pa­
rental income, empirical evidence shows that they frequently take it 
into consideration.13 
5. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(c) (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(c) (West 1993). 
6. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.6 (1994). 
7. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(3) (1999). 
8. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(2) (Michie 1998). 
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994). 
10. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(9) (Michie 1998). 
11.  See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 538-39 (1984). 
12. See, e.g., Albergottie v. James, 470 A.2d 266, 271-72 (D.C. 1983); In re Marriage of 
Wilhelm, 491 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Hadamik v. Hadamik, 644 N.Y.S.2d 
814, 816 (App. Div. 1996); White v. White, 506 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1973); Fanning v. Fanning, 
717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo. 1986). 
13. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of 
Judges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOL. 492, 494 (1981) (finding that judges ranked parents' financial 
sufficiency as fourteenth in a list of twenty suggested factors for awarding child custody, 
giving it a mean importance rank of 6.97 on an importance scale of 1 (of little importance) to 
11 (highly important)); Leighton E. Stamps, Seth Kunen, & Robert Lawyer, Judicial Atti­
tudes Regarding Custody and Visitation Issues, 25 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 23, 33 (1996) 
(finding that in a survey of judges asking them to rate the importance of various factors in 
their child-custody decisionmaking on a scale of 1 (not very important) to 5 (very impor­
tant), the average rating for "[t]he capacity of the parents to provide the child with food, 
clothing, medical care, and material needs" was 3.9); Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The Brady 
Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried 
Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2120-21 (1993) (finding that courts mention economic fac­
tors more than any other specific factors). 
Similar results have also been found in studies of clinicians asked to evaluate child cus­
tody placements. Clinicians' evaluations are often heavily relied upon by courts in their cus­
tody decisions. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Evaluations: Criteria and Clinical Impli­
cations, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 35, 37 (1985) (finding that clinicians ranked 
parents' financial sufficiency as seventeenth most important in a list of twenty-six factors, 
giving it a 7.35 rank on a scale of 1 (of little importance) to 11 (highly important)). 
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Despite the strength of the intuition that wealth must be relevant 
to children's interests, this Note recommends eliminating considera­
tion of financial factors in child custody determinations, except when 
one parent cannot, even with child support payments, provide for the 
child in a minimally adequate manner. This position is consistent with 
recent statutory developments in Missouri and Oregon,14 as well as a 
well-established common law rule in Pennsylvania,15 which courts in 
other states have adopted.16 States may eliminate consideration of 
wealth through either the statutory or common law route.17 
14. See Mo. REV. STAT.§ 452.375.6 (1994) ("As between the parents of a child, no pref­
erence may be given to either parent in the awarding of custody because of that parent's age, 
sex, or financial status, nor because of the age or sex of the child."); OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.137(3) ("In determining custody of a minor child under ORS 107.105 or 107.135, the 
court shall consider the conduct, marital status, income, social environment or life style of 
either party only if it is shown that any of these factors are causing or may cause emotional 
or physical damage to the child."). 
15. See Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re Custody of 
Pearce, 456 A.2d 597, 599-600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re Wesley J.K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1245 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); G. J.F. v. K.B.F., 425 A.2d 459, 460-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); 
Pennsylvania ex rel. Cutler v. Cutler, 369 A.2d 821, 824 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). 
16. See In re Marriage of Gravatt, 371 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Boyd v. 
Boyd, 647 So. 2d 414, 417-18 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 527 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988); Rosiana C. v. Pierre S., 594 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (App. Div. 1993); Bilodeau v. 
Bilodeau, 557 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (App. Div. 1990). 
17. Despite some controversy about the use of common law rules, they are a generally 
well accepted and desirable tool for improving the quality of judicial decisionmaking, even in 
the highly discretionary area of family law. Even without explicit legislative authorization, 
courts are empowered to create common law rules to improve their decisionmaking under 
the statute. Child custody disputes are precisely the kinds of situations where courts' power 
to constrain their own discretion can be essential to achieving the ultimate goal of furthering 
the interests of the child. Such judicial common law rulemaking may have been the aim of 
legislatures in adopting such a broad standard for child custody determinations. Carl 
Schneider has referred to the best interests standard as exemplifying "rule-building" discre­
tion - discretion that is awarded in the hopes that, with experience and time, courts will de­
velop better rules than the legislature could have developed ex ante. Carl E. Schneider, Dis­
cretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 2215, 2244 (1991). This may be the reason that judicially crafted common law rules are 
common in the child custody context. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce 
Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 514 
(1996). In fact, in his discussion of the optimal mix of rules and discretion in child custody 
decisionmaking, Carl Schneider recommends that courts move farther in the direction of 
carving out presumptions and rules within the broad best interests of the child standard. 
Schneider, supra, at 2297. This approach is also preferred by Mary Ann Glendon. Mary Ann 
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1986). 
The most famous of these cominon law rules is West Virginia's primary caretaker pre­
sumption, where courts were bound to award custody to the parent who had provided the 
greatest degree of daily care in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. The ra­
tionale behind this rule was that being placed with the primary caretaker was more often 
than not the better placement for the child, and that constraining judicial discretion in this 
way would lead to better results for children in the aggregate. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 
357 (W. Va. 1981). 
Although the fact that imposing constraints on judicial discretion in custody decisions 
asks judges to blind themselves to some factors in an individual case in order to secure 
greater overall accuracy may seem problematic, it can easily be justified. In adopting a com-
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This Note takes a child-centered approach, arguing that eliminat­
ing consideration of wealth in judicial determinations of post-divorce 
child custody may further the interests of children. Although, as Part I 
demonstrates, the possession of wealth is clearly relevant to children's 
interests, Part II shows that judicial consideration of wealth, beyond 
the level of basic subsistence, may lead to decisions that are not in 
children's interests. Wealth allows the distorting influence of socio­
economic biases and cognitive errors, obscures the importance of child 
support as a means of meeting children's financial needs, and creates 
harmful incentives for parental behavior in divorce litigation. Part Ill 
briefly defends an exception that allows consideration of wealth when 
minimal subsistence is implicated. 
I. THE RELEVANCE OF WEALTH 
As an initial matter, wealth obviously plays a role in a child's well­
being. It does not necessarily follow, though, that judicial considera­
tion of this factor will result in better child custody decisionmaking. 
Using the rules of evidence as a metaphor, the relevance of all infor­
mation must be weighed against the possibility that its inclusion will 
distort the decisionmaking process more than it enables it.18 This Part 
discusses the first half of this balancing test: the relevance of wealth to 
children's interests. 
Because the conclusion that financial resources are important to 
children's interests is so strongly intuitive, it may seem that there is lit­
tle need to defend wealth as a relevant factor in determining the best 
interests of the child. Nevertheless, two California courts, and a few 
commentators,19 have challenged even this basic intuition, so some­
thing in the way of defense is required. This Note objects to the con­
sideration of wealth in child custody decisionmaking, but not for the 
simple reason that it does not matter to children. The relevance of 
wealth must be asserted fairly before the case against it can be made. 
Section I.A demonstrates that wealth is in fact relevant to the best 
interests of the child. Section LB discusses the broader social concerns 
that lead courts and commentators to deny the relevance of wealth. 
mon law rule, courts are not, as it may appear, sacrificing the interests of the particular child 
who is the subject of the litigation to the interests of children in general. Rather, a common 
law is created when judges wish to stop themselves from considering wealth because they 
could never really know when they were considering it appropriately, and because they are 
more likely to be wrong than right in any given case. To put the matter another way, no one 
ever decides a case under a common law rule knowing with any degree of certainty that it is 
to the disadvantage of any particular child. 
18. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence is not admissible if the possi­
bility of prejudice from inclusion outweighs its probative value. FED. R. Evm. 403. 
19. See infra note 33. 
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Section LC issues a few caveats to the relevance of wealth: although it 
is clearly relevant, its importance is frequently overstated. 
A. Why Wealth Matters 
Although the question of how to determine the best interests of 
the child is controversial,20 the most commonly accepted notions of the 
standard are child-centered. The best interests of the child standard 
was adopted precisely because of fears that the child's perspective was 
lost in the storm that resulted from each parent, with his or her lawyer, 
advocating for adult interests. The new test was intended to keep the 
court's focus on what is good for the child.21 
The view that financial resources are not relevant to children's 
positive experience of life is rightly dismissed as "idealistic. "22 On each 
of the two most influential child-centered views of children's best in­
terests, wealth matters. One of these views, advanced by David 
Chambers, advocates decisionmaking based on a child's hypothetical 
future assessment of the custody choice; i.e., decisions are evaluated 
based on how positively the child will experience them.23 As Chambers 
recognizes, on this view, wealth matters. Access to financial resources 
makes one's experience of life, generally speaking, better. Wealth in­
creases access to positive opportunities and decreases the likelihood of 
various negative traumas, such as transportation difficulties, home­
lessness, hunger, and serious illness without adequate medical care.24 
A relationship between socioeconomic status and reported happiness 
has been documented, as well as a relationship between socioeco­
nomic status and reported life satisfaction.25 Lower socioeconomic 
status increases sources of stress26 and is correlated with lower self­
esteem in children of divorced families.27 Studies have shown that a 
20. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1 (describing the potential for controversy inher­
ent in such an uncertain standard). 
21. Chambers, supra note 11, at 487. 
22. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 28 (1987). 
23. See generally Chambers, supra note 11. 
24. See id. at 539-40. 
25. See MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS 91-97 (1987); ANGUS 
CAMPBELL, THE SENSE OF WELL-BEING IN AMERICA 58, 241 (1981). 
26. See generally Alan C. Acock & K. Jill Kiecolt, Is It Family Structure or Socio­
economic Status? Family Structure During Adolescence and Adult Adjustment, 68 Soc. 
FORCES 553 (1989). 
27. See generally N.J. Shook & J. Jurich, Correlates of Self-Esteem Among College Off­
spring from Divorce Families: A Study of Sex-Based Differences, 18 J. DIVORCE & 
REMARRIAGE No. 18-3/4, at 157 (1992). 
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radical lowering of socioeconomic status upon divorce can cause psy­
chological problems in children.28 
A competing child-centered view is advanced by Jon Elster, whose 
conception of children's best interests is aimed at protecting a child's 
autonomy.29 Under this test, the best interest standard secures for 
children the ability to make their own choices as they develop the ca­
pability to do so. He too recognizes that under his view of children's 
best interests, wealth is clearly relevant.30 Except for children of very 
affluent parents,31 increasing availability of financial resources also in­
creases their access to opportunities for autonomous choice -
through access to education, travel, and cultural activities, as well as 
the more basic human goods.32 
B. Denial and Broader Social Values 
Given the clear relevance of wealth to children's best interests, it 
may seem strange that anyone has argued otherwise. But they have: in 
particular, California courts (and several commentators) have claimed 
that wealth has nothing to do with the best interests of the child.33 
Because wealth is so obviously relevant to children's interests, 
these arguments are better read as appeals for consideration of other 
concerns. Denying the relevance of wealth to the best interests of the 
child may be another way of inserting the interests of third parties and 
28. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: 
WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 71 (1991): 
Quite often their distress is rooted in, or at least intensified by, financial problems. Loss of 
the father's income can cause a disruptive, downward spiral in which children must adjust to 
a declining standard of living, a mother who is less psychologically available and is home less 
often, an apartment in an unfamiliar neighborhood, a different school, and new friends. 
Id. at 71. See also JAMES A. TWAITE ET AL., CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: ADJUSTMENT, 
PARENTAL CONFLICT, CUSTODY, REMARRIAGE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CLINICIANS 178-85 (1998). 
29. See generally Elster, supra note 22. 
30. See id. 
31. At some point, the diminishing margin of return makes access to further resources 
not particularly significant for the welfare of children. 
32. See Elster, supra note 22, at 15, 28. 
33. In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (Cal. App. 1990) (stating that by 
relying upon the father's greater financial resources, the lower court "improperly presume[d] 
that children should live in the community of the parent who is wealthier. This factor has 
nothing to do with the best interests of the child."); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 
(Cal. 1986) ("The trial court's decision referred to William's better economic position, and 
to matters such as homeownership and ability to provide a more 'wholesome environment ' 
which reflect economic advantage. But . . .  '[T]here is no basis for assuming a correlation 
between wealth and good parenting or wealth and happiness. '") (citing Ramsay Laing Klaff, 
The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 350 (1982)). See also Nancy D. 
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody De­
terminations, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1992). 
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other social values into the custody determination.34 Concerns about 
sex discrimination have been particularly prevalent in discussions of 
the issue, and likely drive most attempts to eliminate wealth as a fac­
tor. 35 For instance, in In re Marriage of Fingert, a California Court of 
Appeals attempted to justify its claim that wealth was irrelevant by 
stating: 
[W]omen are more likely to be unemployed than men and, when they 
are employed, earn less, regardless of race or level of education. Any 
rule based on the relative wealth of parents will almost invariably favor 
men. Such a ruling has the effect of discriminating against women.36 
Unfairness to women is an unfortunate consequence of considering 
wealth in child custody determinations. In general, mothers have less 
access to financial resources than their male counterparts, due largely 
to the legacy of the patriarchal family. This wealth disparity has two 
types of causes. The effect of discrimination in wages and hiring, and 
the greater likelihood that women will choose to remain out of the 
workforce to care for their children.37 Differentials caused by discrimi­
nation are almost uncontestedly unfair to women.38 Wealth effects 
caused by women's life choices should also be a cause for concern, de­
spite arguments that women's exercise of autonomous choice should 
be sufficient to guard against unfairness.39 The fact that the choices of 
social roles in this context are particularly constrained by the residual 
influence of patriarchy,40 along with skepticism about whether it is 
34. Jon Elster argues that the desire to further various policy preferences, rather than 
secure children's interests, explains the reluctance to consider wealth in custody detennina­
tions. Elster, supra note 22, at 27-28. 
35. Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 
325, 329 (1996-1997) ("Some states exclude parental wealth from custody decisions to vindi­
cate norms of equality."). A Michigan Court of Appeals court recently cautioned: "This 
court recognizes that placing undue reliance on [the financial] factor is unfair because in 
most cases the mother, as homemaker, will be disadvantaged." Mazurkiewicz v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 417 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Mich. App. 1987). 
36. 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (App. 1990). Nancy Polikoff makes a similar connection: 
"There is no necessary correlation between economic dominance and the best interests of 
children. In fact, the dominant parent is likely to have achieved that status . . .  through the 
operation of sex discrimination and sex segregation in the workplace." Polikoff, supra note 
33, at 179. 
37. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 540. 
38. See id. 
39. Chambers argues that: 
If there were no gender discrimination in wages, and the only disparity in earnings came 
from the fact that one parent had participated less in the labor market in order to care for 
her children, it would not be bothersome that parents who assume differing roles ... during 
marriage permitted them at separation to offer differing advantages to the child. 
Chambers, supra note 11, at 540-541; see Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (N.D. 
1979). 
40. The fact of constrained choice also provides an argument against claims sometimes 
made that mothers should be rewarded for the particularly meritorious sacrifices they make 
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good to encourage parties to make choices during marriage that con­
template divorce,41 counsels against relying simply on parental choice 
to gauge equity. 
Another social value that may underlie attempts to eliminate con­
sideration of wealth from custody determinations is the desire to sup­
port cultural pluralism - diversity in the lifestyles and beliefs of 
members of society - through family law.42 Courts are generally re­
luctant to decide which families children should live with based on cer­
tain types of social differences between parents. Since the family oper­
ates as an important element in society, where people's values and 
interests are shaped and expressed, courts are rightly reluctant to use 
their power to force families to reflect values and beliefs that are 
deeply contested.43 Correspondingly, courts avoid using racial or re­
ligious factors in placing children.44 When disputes are between par­
ents and nonparents, courts emphatically refuse to consider wealth.45 
in choosing the caretaking role. See, e.g., Bilodeau v. Bilodeau, 557 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. 
1990); Horne, supra note 13, at 2122-24; Mnookin, supra note 1, at 284 (1975); Susan Beth 
Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Cus­
tody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 857 (1997). See also Altman, supra note 35, at 
336-37 (arguing that primary caretaking involves sacrifices that are more meritorious than 
earning). Men may feel as constrained by sex roles from staying home with their children as 
women do from remaining in the workplace. 
41. The notion that parents should accept the post-divorce fate that they have chosen 
goes against the commonly-held notion that we should neither expect nor encourage parents 
to make their choices based on the likelihood of divorce. While it is true that divorce is 
common, few people enter into a marriage with full awareness of that possibility. See Lynn 
A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993). 
To award custody to parents based on what they have to offer as individuals after having 
encouraged them to provide goods to their children as a unit appears strikingly contradic­
tory. 
42. See Elster, supra note 22, at 27-28 (describing the reason behind eliminating consid­
erations of wealth: "[a] society committed to the value of equality must sometimes treat its 
citizens as equal when in fact they are not."). 
43. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Par.mts, and the Moral Basis 
of the Family, 91 ETHICS6 (1980). But see David A. J. Richards, The Individual, The Family, 
and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 31-39 (1980) (criti­
cizing the Supreme Court's tendency to attach these values to the family, rather than the in­
dividual). 
This demand for neutrality on contested social issues has been one of the classic justifi­
cations for parental rights. See generally David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity, 
Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 205 
(1997). But cf Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. 
REV. 151, 160-61 (1988) (suggesting that our present law may not be consistent with plural­
ism and that the concept may be too vague to be useful); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion 
and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 
1442-46 (1994) (arguing that the interest in pluralism is not sufficient to justify parental 
rights). 
44. See infra note 48. 
45. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (per Stevens, J. in chambers) 
("[C]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers 
more advantages.") (quoting In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992)); In re J.M.P., 
224 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:216 
Differences in social class are as central a part of the nation's diversity 
as race or religion.46 Of course, making decisions between two parents 
based on wealth does not pose nearly as large a threat to a plural cul­
ture,47 but discomfort with preferences for higher-class existence must 
at least partly explain the calls to eliminate this factor. 
Whether to consider broader social values in custody decisions that 
are supposed to be made in the best interests of the child is extremely 
controversial.48 But courts ought to be honest when making decisions 
for these reasons, and not use the legal structure of the interests of 
children as a means to secure other ends. Although introducing 
broader social values into custody decisions may be desirable, it does 
528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988) (holding that a "broad social policy" of noninterference in 
families outweighs any consideration of material advantage); Jn re Guardianship of Doney, 
570 P.2d 575, 578 (Mont. 1977) ("Manifestly, the expression 'welfare of the child' was never 
intended to penalize a parent because he may not be financially able to provide his child 
with the comforts and advantages which more fortunate parents may provide for their chil­
dren.") (quoting Ex Parte Bourquin, 290 P. 250, 251-52 (Mont. 1930)); In re Adoption of L., 
462 N.E.2d 1165, 1170 (N.Y. 1984) ("emphatically" rejecting consideration of financial fac­
tors because mother's poverty "should not be held against her" (citing New York ex rel. 
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787, 792 (N.Y. 1971); Bennett v. 
Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976); People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895 
(N.Y. 1952). 
This point is made particularly eloquently in Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W. 869, 873 (1919) 
(Bronson, J., dissenting): 
If such be the rule, well might the bright, intelligent child in the humblest home of poor, de­
voted parents be taken and given to the home much better provided and with much greater 
facilities existing, owing to the prominence and wealth of the owners, but strangers to the 
child, when, in the viewpoint of the chancellor, the best welfare of the child, as a future citi­
zen of this state, would be subserved. Such applications of equity do violence to the . . . as­
surance that modern society and civilization has given to them; the assurance that, no matter 
how humble their home may be, or how little of this world's possessions they may have, their 
child, begotten by them, shall remain with them . . . .  
46. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 
TEXAS L. REV. 1847, 1885-88 (1996). Even though class diversity may be an important ele­
ment of a plural society, race and religion probably lay much stronger claims. For instance, 
governmental campaigns to redistribute wealth are not nearly as problematic as campaigns 
to eliminate religious differences. 
47. See Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 
888 (1992). 
48. It is undeniable that, where social matters are particularly important, many instances 
of child custody adjudication reflect social values as well as the interest of the child involved. 
Even where there is no clear mandate to do so, courts often refuse to consider the effects of 
parental disability, race, religion, use of day care (reflecting a concern with sex discrimina­
tion), and sometimes even sexual orientation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 
1310 (Colo. 1985); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987); Ireland v. Smith, 542 
N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); 
Stone v. Stone, 133 P.2d 526 (Wash. 1943); Jn re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1980); Welker v. Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. 1964). 
Yet there is legitimate cause for concern that considering broader social values may 
dwarf the interests of children. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 499-503; Wendy Anton 
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 11, 53 (1994). But see Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 49-50 (1997) (arguing that children's interests and other social interests of­
ten overlap). 
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no good to confuse the issue by cloaking these values in the language 
of the best interest of the child. Whatever may be said for considering 
social values and third party interests, they do not necessarily coincide 
with the interests of children. This Note aims to give more honest, de­
tailed, and child-centered arguments against the use of wealth in child­
custody decisions. 
C. Qualifying the Importance of Wealth 
Some caution is necessary in asserting the relevance of wealth to 
children's best interests. First, the importance of wealth tends to be 
overestimated in relation to other factors. Though it is undeniably 
relevant, wealth plays a very limited role in life satisfaction, all things 
considered.49 People have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of 
wealth to well-being.5° For this reason, courts ought to be cautious 
when assessing the importance of wealth in relation to other factors. 
Second, it is difficult to isolate wealth from the other factors that 
matter to children's interests. This interrelationship among factors 
raises the possibility that wealth is correlated with other features -
such as a lack of commitment to or interest in the child - that cut in 
the other direction, making custody with the wealthier parent also dis­
advantageous. The strong claim, that possession of greater financial 
resources necessarily indicates lesser commitment to the child, cannot 
be supported. But a weaker claim, that some decisions to amass per­
sonal wealth may suggest a lower priority on the interests of children, 
should at least temper enthusiasm for custody with the wealthier par­
ent. 
Mary Becker has made the strong claim that the wealthier parent is 
very likely to also be the worse parent, for reasons directly correlated 
with the possession· of wealth.51 According to Becker, the parent who 
makes financial sacrifices for the child is, by definition, more commit­
ted. Becker speaks in a general way about sex role differences, oper­
ating on the quite defensible assumption that women tend to be the 
less wealthy parents. But her argument can easily be individualized 
into the economic claim that, gender aside, the possession of wealth is 
proof that one is a less committed parent: 
Women's poor economic status relative to men [in part) reflects women's 
greater commitment to children. . . . If women and men were equally 
49. See ARGYLE, supra note 25, at 95 ("[C]lass and income have a definite, but quite 
small, effect on happiness."). 
50. See CAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 59 ("It is always better to be rich than poor. This is 
a fact which is universally understood: what is not so well-recognized is how modest this rela­
tionship is and how many other influences come into play in determining an individual's 
feelings of well-being."). 
51.  Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 157 (1992). 
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concerned about children's welfare, women would refuse to bear and 
raise children, given the economic consequences, unless men . . . trans­
ferred sufficient assets to women to offset their economic loss in wage la­
bor. Therefore, women's poor economic status is itself evidence of their 
commitment to, concern for, and emotional investment with, children.52 
Because the work of raising children interferes with the accumulation 
of wealth, Becker asserts that the possession of wealth can itself serve 
as evidence of a lack of parental commitment. 
In its strongest form - using wealth as a direct indication of the 
level of commitment of different parents - Becker's claim is flawed 
from an economic perspective. In a world where women are discrimi­
nated against in the employment market and receive lower wages than 
men for the same labor, women do not have the power to strike the 
sort of bargain with men that Becker proposes.53 Their choice is not 
between making a "male" salary or having children - if it were, they 
could perhaps demand from devoted fathers that the burdens of hav­
ing and raising children be equally distributed between both parents. 
But this is not the world women live in - what a woman gives up in 
wages in exchange for raising a child is considerably less than what a 
man would sacrifice. Even between equally committed parents, the ra­
tional baby-bargain would leave women with a lower income. Thus, 
economic inequality cannot serve as direct evidence of parental com­
mitment in our society.54 
Even if Becker's strong claim were true, it could not alone justify 
the complete exclusion of wealth from the best interests detennina­
tion. Becker's arguments essentially use a lack of wealth as a proxy for 
parental commitment. But the commitment of the parent to the child, 
although very important, is only one among many factors relevant to a 
child's best interests, however defined.55 Becker's claim would merely 
indicate that the presence of one factor (wealth) is good evidence for a 
discrepancy in another factor (parental commitment). It does not 
show that wealth is not itself important to children's welfare. Wealth 
could still operate as a tie-breaker between equally committed par­
ents, or even as a benefit that could outweigh the burden of being 
placed with a less committed parent. 
Softened somewhat, however, Becker's argument issues an impor­
tant caution that should be taken seriously. Courts should be aware of 
the prospect that, for some parents with greater financial resources, 
this may be the most they have to offer. Wealth may sometimes be a 
52. Id. at 157. 
53. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC 
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 37, 197-99 nn.3-7 (1991). 
54. Becker additionally fails to account for situations where wealth is unrelated to wage­
earning, such as when it is inherited, won in the lottery, or provided through remarriage. 
55. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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sign of parental priorities that work against the interests of their chil­
dren. The possibility that wealth may sometimes, though certainly not 
always, be correlated with other parental features that are less than 
beneficial for children makes unqualified support for custody with the 
wealthier parent inappropriate. As this section shows, wealth has a 
clear, although not an absolute, role in the best interests of the child. 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CONSIDERING WEALTH 
Despite the relevance of wealth to children's best interests, consid­
eration of financial factors can lead to distorted judicial decisionmak­
ing that can work against the interests of the child. This Part argues 
that considering wealth in child custody determinations leads to four 
significant problems that may ultimately make it better for children if 
wealth is ignored. Section II.A discusses the distorting impact of so­
cioeconomic biases, causing judges to take wealth and wealth­
correlated factors more seriously than they merit. Section II.B argues 
that a different effect, the tendency in a multi-factor analysis to give 
disproportionate weight to factors that can be known with certainty, 
will lead judges to give wealth more importance than it deserves. Sec­
tion 11.C demonstrates how consideration of wealth in child custody 
determinations invites judges to use custody to avoid large child sup­
port orders. This lessens the ability of these two tools - child support 
and custody - to work together to maximize the welfare of children 
post-divorce. Finally, Section 11.D shows that consideration of wealth 
encourages parents to engage in various activities, such as increased 
litigation, that are detrimental to children. 
A. Judicial Bias 
Upper and middle-class family court judges are not immune from 
pervasive socio-economic biases. Most judges are reasonably wealthy, 
and it is common to exaggerate the importance of the features of one's 
own lifestyle.56 Of course, a judge would be correct in believing that 
family wealth makes some difference in children's well-being.57 The 
problem with bias is that it leads to an exaggerated perception of these 
effects. In general, discretion in the best interests determination gives 
free reign to such distorting unconscious biases, resulting in custody 
awards that are not necessarily in the best interests of the child.58 
56. See Fitzgerald, supra note 48, at 62. Courts note the "clean[liness]" of the higher 
earning parent, see, e.g., White v. White, 506 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1973), or that parent's 
"stab[ility]," see, e.g., In re Marriage of Wilhelm, 491 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Iowa 1992). Emphasis 
is also placed on various upper-class values such as the ability of the child to have his or her 
own room. Hadamik v. Hadamik, 644 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. App. 1996). 
57. See infra Section I.A. 
58. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 2267-68. 
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A similar problem has been clearly noted with considerations of 
race in custody decisions.59 The Supreme Court's decision in Palmore 
v. Sidoti/'0 which held unconstitutional judicial consideration of the ef­
fects of racial prejudice in deciding whether to place a child in the cus­
tody of a mixed-race couple, gave constitutional status to concerns 
about judicial racial bias. The decision has been read as creating a con­
stitutional common law rule to counter racist unconscious biases: 
[T]aking all child custody decisions into account, and in particular being 
aware that family court judges themselves may be infected with biases 
that lead them to make distorted all-things-considered judgments, the 
Court concluded that the formalist rule barring consideration of private 
racial biases would lead to more accurate determinations of what was in 
the child's best interests than a rule allowing family court judges to take 
everything into account.61 
Biases about wealth raise similar concerns about distorted judicial 
decisionmaking. A common law rule against considering wealth is not 
constitutionally required because wealth is not a characteristic: pro­
tected by heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.62 As 
a policy matter, however, the same considerations that led the Court 
to constrain discretion in Palmore make such a rule a desirable tool 
for ensuring that children end up in the best placement. 
Judicial bias is; of course, common in areas other than wealth. One 
commentator has pointed out that judges are equally likely to over­
emphasize "being articulate, attractive, well-educated, or well-
59. See Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of 
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (199011991). 
60. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Palmore was explicitly cited as support for the refusal to con­
sider wealth by the California appeals court in In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
61. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L.  
REV. 1, 16 (1996). The connection between Palmore and consideration of wealth in child 
custody determinations is made, although ultimately rejected, in Altman, supra note 35, at 
328-30. 
62. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); 
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.25 (5th ed. 1995). As to the application of rational basis scrutiny 
to this matter, see Dempsey v. Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on 
other grounds, 296 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980) ("The legislative determination that relative 
economic circumstances be [considered] . . .  has a rational basis."). 
There have been some attempts to classify consideration of wealth as constitutionally 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, because women typically have fewer resources 
than men seeking custody of their children. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses 
of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 
WISC. L. REV. 107, 136; Leonore Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Eco­
nomic Consequences of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 
1181, 1241 (1981). At least under the law as it stands, it is difficult to make this claim. Al­
though the consideration of wealth has a disporportoniate impact on women, it is difficult to 
show that this consideration is motivated by a desire to discriminate against them, as the law 
would require. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). But see Becker, supra note 51, 
at 175 (suggesting such a motive); Home, supra note 13, at 2121-22 (same). 
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adjusted."63 He argues that it makes no sense to single out considera­
tions of wealth for special condemnation, if we allow all of these other 
factors to influence judicial decisionmaking. But there are reasons to 
treat socio-economic bias differently than these other distorting fac­
tors. First, outside of considerations of income, there is no comparable 
evidentiary question to address: what is it that judges would do to 
blind themselves to the impact of parental attractiveness? No matter 
how problematic it is, there's little that can be realistically done to ad­
dress it. Parental wealth is much different. If consideration of parental 
wealth were forbidden, various pieces of evidence relating to this fac­
tor would be excluded from the proceeding.64 Forming a common law 
rule here makes a difference in addressing overvaluation of socio­
economic status. 
Further, it seems likely that judges already know that they are not 
supposed to choose between parents on the basis of attractiveness or 
articulateness. While these things may provide some value to a child, 
judges easily recognize its limits.65 Judges may not be able to exclude 
these considerations from their minds completely, but if asked the 
question: "should you consider the parents' relative attractiveness in 
making this custody determination?," the answer from almost all 
judges would be "no". Most likely, the only reason that there is not al­
ready a common law rule against consideration of these factors is that 
no one has deemed it necessary. Consideration of socioeconomic 
status, like consideration of racial prejudice, is substantially different. 
As the disagreement between courts on this issue has shown, judges 
asked to determine how important wealth is to any particular case 
have a hard question to answer. The existence of this difficult question 
is what makes the common law rule imperative - judges are less 
clearly aware of their bias, and of the need to constrain it. A rule con­
straining this bias is necessary, because the instincts to disregard the 
factor are not well developed. 
63. See Altman, supra note 35, at 333. 
64. Precisely what evidence would be forbidden could be the subject of some debate. 
Certainly, evidence about the balance in bank accounts and other sources of income would 
be excluded. Presumably, as well, attempts could be made to eliminate evidence about the 
size of each parent's house, or the toys that the child would have access to at either resi­
dence. This latter category is more difficult, of course, because this evidence could also be 
relevant to establishing more relevant factors. 
65. One piece of evidence for the general perception that parental attractiveness would 
of course not be relevant is that, in the surveys of what judges and counselors consider rele­
vant factors for child custody determinations, no one even bothered to ask about it. See su­
pra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Problem of the Too-Clear Factor 
Of all of the factors affecting children's best interests after divorce, 
parental wealth is not the most important but is probably the easiest to 
measure. Attachment to parents and other more ambiguous psycho­
logical factors are generally much more central to children's inter­
ests,66 but also are considerably more indeterminate. Courts looking at 
these complicated issues will inevitably tend to give too much weight 
to the wealth comparison, simply because of its clarity.67 
Appellate courts complain that trial courts rely too heavily on fi­
nancial factors in relation to more important intangible factors. This 
critique is implicit when appellate courts overturn trial courts' custody 
decisions on the basis that "while . . .  consideration of the relative fi­
nancial standing of the parents may be a relevant factor, it is not dis­
positive."68 The existence of a number of reversals on these grounds 
shows that trial courts do give inappropriate weight to financial factors 
by treating them as dispositive in custody proceedings.69 
There is a psychological explanation for the tendency of courts to 
overvalue financial factors. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
have discussed a common cognitive error called the "certainty ef­
fect".70 People have an irrational tendency to overvalue clear out­
comes in relation to ones they know with less certainty. Kahneman 
and Tversky have recently applied this effect to the multivariable deci­
sions involved in conflict resolution. In these sorts of negotiations, 
they claim, parties have a tendency to overvalue certain outcomes, 
such as land transfers, in relation to uncertain ones, such as goodwill.71 
66. See ARGYLE, supra note 25; K.laff, supra note 33; Elizabeth Scott, Rational Deci­
sionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 34 n.75 (1990) ("[T)here is con­
sensus that the relationship between parent and child is a more significant criterion than the 
parent's economic status . . . .  "). 
67. See Horne, supra note 13, at 2125 (expressing concern that care-giving skills tend to 
be devalued because they are not "readily assigned a dollar value"). For a similar point in 
the context of sexuality, see Nadler v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), in which the court expressed concern that the trial court had over­
emphasized the mother's sexuality because it was a crude and obvious characteristic; more 
important and subtle factors, the court held, had been obscured. 
68. Scalia v. Scalia, 217 A.D.2d 780, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
69. See Jennerjohn v. Jennerjohn, 203 N.W.2d 237, 243 (Iowa 1972); Dempsey v. 
Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("Pre-eminent and decisive reliance 
was placed upon defendant's superior economic position."), rev'd on other grounds, 96 
N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980); Wellman v. Dutch, 604 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1993); Smith v. 
Smith, 220 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. 1949). 
70. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Un­
der Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
71. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspec­
tive, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds. 1995) (dis­
cussing cognitive effects through example of the benefits of goodwill compared with those of 
land transfer). 
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Even when an unclear possibility of goodwill is actually worth more to 
a party, the party will still prefer the clearer, but lesser, benefits of 
land transfer. 
Child custody decisionmaking may operate in a similar manner. 
Financial assets are certain, and other parental features, such as emo­
tional attachment, are quite uncertain. The certainty effect thus pro­
vides another reason why eliminating wealth as a factor may improve 
the quality of judicial decisions overall. 
C. Preserving the Child Support Solution 
Several courts that have refused to consider the wealth of the re­
spective parties in custody determinations have explicitly relied on 
child support as the proper means to secure children's financial well­
being.72 Commentators have also designated the child support obliga­
tion as at least a partial solution to the problem of differential parental 
financial resources.73 These courts and commentators are right about 
child support, at least in a limited way. Refusing to consider wealth in 
custody disputes is a way of ensuring that the possibility of lessening 
wealth disparities through child support is taken seriously. 
Child support cannot provide a complete answer to the problem of 
wealth in child custody determinations, because it is only designed to 
partially alleviate true financial disparities between parents. For ex­
ample, some differences in parental wealth do not involve financial re­
sources that are available for transfer through child support, such as 
This effect is significantly different from the concern with the "dwarfing of soft vari­
ables" expressed most famously by Laurence H. Tribe in Trial By Mathematics: Precision 
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361-65 (1971). Tribe was con­
cerned that, if statistical evidence were allowed in trials, it would take on too large a signifi­
cance in jury deliberations because of the appearance of mathematical precision; see also 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1704 (1975). Psychological evidence has failed to bear out this phenomenon. Jurors, in 
fact, tend to undervalue statistical "base rate" evidence in relation to specific facts about a 
case. See Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 49 (1996) (arguing against Tribe that jurors under-utilize probabilistic evidence); 
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy 
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 
(1990). 
This dismissal of Tribe's concern about the use of statistical base rates, however, does 
not refute the impact of the certainty effect. Although statistics are quantified, they are no 
more intrinsically certain than other evidence. Rather, all that statistics do is quantify the 
degree of uncertainty in a factor. In fact, it may be just this uncertainty that causes them to 
be undervalued. The court's ability to determine wealth, on the other hand, is quantifiably 
certain. 
72. See Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491-92 (Cal. 1986); Boyd v. Boyd, 647 So. 2d 
414, 418 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 527 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (La. Ct. App. 1988); 
Dempsey v. Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 
296 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980); Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Wis. 1984). 
73. See Altman, supra note 35, at 339; Klaff, supra note 33, at 350-51; Mnookin, supra 
note 1, at 284; Polikoff, supra note 33, at 179. 
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resources from a parent's new spouse.74 These resources would be 
available to a child in the remarried parent's household, but are not 
funds eligible for transfer to the other parent.75 
In addition, even when dealing with resources that are available to 
be transferred through child support, the existing system does not con­
template a complete redistribution of wealth in order to secure chil­
dren's best interests: "[A] child support order may not accuratdy re­
flect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent can 
reasonably be expected to pay."76 State legislatures have further un­
dercut the obligation in order to address issues of perceived fairness to 
support-paying parents (typically fathers77) and their new families.78 
Thus, even when all family resources are potentially eligible for child 
support, and child support schemes are perfectly enforced, differen­
tials in the financial resources available in different households will 
remain. 
Although child support cannot completely resolve the problem, 
the benefits of using it to its fullest extent suggest another reason not 
to consider wealth. If courts are allowed to consider financial factors 
in custody, they may be motivated partly by the desire to lessen the 
need for child support. Given the increasing popularity of the father's 
rights movement, which frequently decries large child support pay­
ments as unfair to a noncustodial parent, it is very likely that at least 
some judges share the sentiment.79 Considerations of wealth can be 
used to subvert the purposes and structures of this sometimes un­
popular duty.80 In G.J.F. v. K.B.F. , a Pennsylvania court awarded cus­
tody to the wealthier father partially so that he would not have to pro­
vide child support, explicitly stating that if the father were granted 
custody, he would not have to pay child support and "finance a second 
household."81 What was explicit in G.J.F. is undoubtedly implicit in 
other decisions. 
74. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5(a) (West 1994) (exempting new mate's income 
from the funds available for transfer through child support); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
156.404 (Vernon 1996) (same). 
75. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY 
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 677 (1996). 
76. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981); accord McCartor v. Parr 612 
S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). 
77. See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of 
Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 264 (1994). 
78. See Marvin M. Moore, The Significance of a Divorced Father 's Remarriage in Adju-
dicating a Motion to Modify His Child Support Obligations, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 483 (1989). 
79. See Polikoff, supra note 33, at 179. 
80. See id. 
81. Court of Common Pleas, Butler County, A.O. No. 79-371, Book 1 14 Page 188, va­
cated by G.J.F. v. K.B.F., 425 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). 
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The historical roots of the development of the child support obliga­
tion show that it was intended to work with custody as a means of en­
suring children's best interests. Before the child support obligation be­
came part of divorce proceedings, custody was often awarded to 
parents based purely on their independent abilities to support their 
children financially.82 Women were only rarely able to win custody of 
their children under this standard even though, at that time, the dis­
parity between men's and women's emotional involvement in the lives 
of their children was likely greater than today. One of the major ad­
vantages of the duty of post-divorce child support is that children are 
able to live with the parent to whom they are more attached, while at 
the same time receiving adequate resources. Allowing judges to use 
child custody decisions to lessen child support payments abandons this 
desirable flexibility, and thus jeopardizes the interests of children. 
Focusing on the availability of child support, then, does not pro­
vide a justification for the complete elimination of the consideration of 
wealth. It does, however, provide another reason why, all things con­
sidered, it is better for children if parental wealth is not taken into ac­
count. Disallowing consideration of wealth in deciding custody allows 
custody and child support to be more effectively used together to se­
cure children's well-being. 
D. Incentive Effects 
Children's welfare is also aided by removal of some of the incen­
tives caused by inclusion of wealth as a factor in custody decisions. 
The substantive rules of adjudication influence the behavior of par­
ents. Eliminating consideration of wealth eliminates undesirable in­
centives for divorcing parents, such as the incentive for parents who 
have little to offer other than wealth to litigate, and the incentive to 
impoverish the other parent and child pending custody determina­
tions. 
Inclusion of wealth as a factor inserts another variable that can 
give parents with a marginal chance of success an incentive to liti­
gate,83 subjecting the child to a very difficult process.84 Any constraint 
on judicial discretion in custody determinations would of course re­
duce litigation, and consequently spare children a degree of agony.85 
82. See Polikoff, supra note 33, at 176; Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the 
Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807, 818-20 (1988/1989). 
83. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 959-66 (1979); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental 
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 643 (1992). 
84. See generally Elster, supra note 22; Robert Burt, Experts, Custody Disputes & Legal 
Fantasies, 14 PSYCHIATRIC HOSP. 140 (1982). 
85. See generally Elster, supra note 22. 
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One commentator has even suggested that deciding custody through a 
coin flip would be more desirable than the present system.86 The need 
to enable settlement and avoid litigation by constraining judicial dis­
cretion was one of the concerns underlying the creation of West 
Virginia's primary caretaker presumption, a common law rule that 
constrains judicial discretion by establishing a preference for awarding 
custody to the parent who had provided most of the daily care of the 
child.87 
But not all devices that constrain or decrease litigation are worth 
adopting. The procedural advantages of constraints on discretion 
sometimes come at a substantive cost. Children have an interest in 
achieving certain substantive custody outcomes as well as avoiding dif­
ficult processes. Thus, the advantages of lessening litigation need to be 
weighed against the disadvantage of losing judicial power to choose 
better placements for children. A random process like the suggested 
coin flip is not tailored toward eliminating litigation in any particular 
class of cases likely to lead to undesirable substantive outcomes. Using 
random measures, children will certainly end up in less desirable 
placements a significant amount of the time.88 
The common law rule eliminating consideration of wealth is a 
compelling means of reducing litigation because it is tailored to a class 
of cases where eliminating the rule is also likely to correlate with bet­
ter substantive outcomes. As we have seen, a rule eliminating consid­
erations of wealth can enhance the quality of substantive decisions 
about custody. At its extremes, this rule will discourage parents who 
have little claim to custody other than financial advantage (which is of 
limited value compared to other parental features)89 from litigating 
their custody disputes. The rule proposed here is much more like the 
presumption that a child should be placed with her primary care­
taker,90 which limits discretion in a way that also generally correlates 
with desirable substantive outcomes. 
Elimination of wealth also lessens another troublesome practice, 
money-for-custody trades. For this reason, children of parents who 
eventually settle out of court will be better off with a custody rule that 
eliminates consideration of this factor. Wide discretion in custody out­
comes leads to uncertain results; parents who are not willing to risk 
losing custody of their children (often the most committed parents) 
86. Elster, supra note 22, at 40-43. Contra Herring, supra note 43, at 232-37 (id<!ntifying 
advantages and disadvantages of the coin-flip solution and concluding that the latter out­
weigh the former). 
87. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). 
88. A random process may also carry with it a distressing message of societal indiffer­
ence, which itself may be harmful to parents and children. 
89. See supra Section LC. 
90. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363. 
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may not be willing to enter litigation. In their settlements, they may 
sacrifice property division and child support arrangements in order to 
ensure custody.91 This leaves children without the benefit of those fi­
nancial resources, and, on the whole, worse off.92 
Removing the ability of parents to use wealth as a weapon in pri­
vate bargains addresses this problem directly. Aiming the common law 
rule at parents who have little to offer other than financial gain is a 
very finely tuned means of addressing the financial bargaining prob­
lem. It would most commonly remove a bargaining tool from the 
wealthier parent in situations where the financial disparity between 
the parties is the greatest. It is precisely in these situations where a 
parent whose claim to custody would otherwise be weak, that a parent 
would be able to credibly litigate on the basis of financial advantage. 
The children of these parents have the most to lose when one parent 
sacrifices a financial settlement for custody. 
Finally, eliminating wealth as a factor in custody disputes discour­
ages a noncustodial parent from stopping voluntary support payments 
to the custodial parent and children before the litigation is settled, as a 
means of ensuring that the financial disparities between the parties 
will appear more pronounced.93 This sort of behavior clearly works 
against the interests of children. Thus, removing consideration of 
wealth discourages some of the least beneficial litigation and bad bar­
gaining behavior outside of litigation to the benefit of the children in­
volved in these cases. 
III. DEFENDING THE EXCEPTION 
Despite the arguments above, that considering wealth is actually 
against children's interests, setting a floor - consideration of a par­
ent's ability to provide for the child's basic needs - can be justified. 
The arguments against considering wealth when the minimum can be 
met typically fall apart when children are in danger of being deprived 
91. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 89 (1995); Scott Altman, Lurking 
in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 498-510 (1995); Glendon, supra note 17, at 1182-83; 
Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J. 429, 432 (1998). This was a 
major motivation behind the crafting of the primary caretaker presumption in Garska v. 
McCoy. 
There is some reason to believe that these custody trades may not actually occur, at least 
not very frequently. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE 
CHILD 44-49 (1992); Schneider, supra note 17, at 2274-79. But see Altman, supra, at 498-510. 
92. See Scott, supra note 83, at 645; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Gender and Child­
Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 
183 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983). 
93. See Horne, supra note 13, at 2124 (citing Collins v. Collins, No. CA 89-333, 1990 WL 
160412 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1990) and Driver v. Driver, No. 89-385-11, 1 990 WL 100422 
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1990) as examples of cases where this strategy apparently met with 
success). 
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of the essentials of existence. Here, forcing courts to ignore basic 
needs would run up against the goal of child neglect statutes. Soon af­
ter the child was placed with the parent who could not provide for ba­
sic needs, child protective services involvement would become immi­
nent, and the child would most likely be eventually removed to the 
home of the parent with greater resources, anyway.94 The concerns 
about inaccuracy in decisionmaking if these factors are considered is 
greatly decreased - while overvaluation of the importance of mar­
ginal degrees of wealth between parents may be inevitable, it is not 
likely that the importance of children being well fed, or receiving basic 
medical care, could be given too much weight.95 
The importance of a minimum also suggests an option for courts 
working within states where consideration of parental wealth is man­
dated by statute, such as in Michigan and Florida;96 these courts could 
read the statute to only require consideration of these basic human 
needs. The focus of the language of these statutory provisions is on the 
basics of human survival - food, clothing, medical care - and not on 
the more marginal benefits of having one's own room, or having more 
expensive toys. Michigan's statutory language requires consideration 
of "the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the 
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recog­
nized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical 
care, and other material needs."97 Florida's statutory language is al­
most identical. Even the catch all at the end is phrased as "other mate­
rial needs," not other material benefits or advantages.98 It is thus quite 
possible to consider these statutory provisions as only setting forth a 
requirement of consideration of minimum financial provision. Thus, 
even those states who seem to require consideration of parental 
wealth in making child custody decisions can adopt the suggested rule. 
94. Child neglect Jaw does not officially allow termination of parental rights, unless the 
neglect is intentional. But custody modification is a tool employed by child protective agen­
cies to solve the problems associated with non-intentional neglect. LEROY H. PELTON, FOR 
REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1989). 
95. The notion is that wealth is "conditionally relevant" - it is not relevant to children's 
best interests more generally, but it is relevant to the ability of a parent to meet bask needs. 
See generally Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without 
Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439 (1994) (arguing that the concept of conditional relevance is an 
essential aspect of the classical model of evidentiary Jaw). 
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c) (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3) 
(West 1993). 
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3) (West 1993). 
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c) (West 1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that, despite the clear relevance of wealth to 
the determination of children's best interests, it may be in the interests 
of children to eliminate consideration of that factor in all cases except 
those implicating minimal subsistence. Of course, only family court 
judges, using their experience and the unique skill that comes from it 
(what Karl Llewellyn called "situation sense"99), know how these con­
siderations play out in the context of real-life custody disputes. The 
delicate balancing required in making difficult custody decisions in the 
interests of children depends at least partly on knowledge few others 
than these judges possess.100 Some judges have indeed decided that, all 
things considered, it is best not to consider parental wealth when 
making these decisions.101 This Note has provided some structure to 
their concerns, and the beginnings of an analysis that will hopefully 
encourage more courts to consider eliminating consideration of wealth 
in custody disputes in the interests of children. 
99. See KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
126-28 (1960). 
100. This suggests a reason to prefer the promulgation of these rules through common 
law rulemaking rather than by statute. 
101. See supra notes 15, 16. 
